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Abstract 
The Second World War Anglo-American alliance was less cohesive on the 
political side than the military. There were widening divergences between Britain 
and the United States with regard to the best way to handle cooperation with the 
USSR during 1944. There were some shared assumptions about the motivations 
of Soviet policy, but policy-makers in Britain and the US not only formulated 
different approaches, but consistently viewed their own ones to be more 
successful than those of their ally. There was an opportunity to coordinate 
polices in US  Under-Secretary of State Edward Stettinius’s mission to London in 
April 1944, but the fact that the issue was barely discussed is symptomatic of the 
situation. The British Foreign Office gained the backing of Winston Churchill in 
an attempt to forge ahead with pragmatic arrangements with the USSR. A 
satisfaction with their own efforts on both sides meant that the British and 
American bureaucracies made no serious and sustained attempt to coordinate 
their policies to the USSR through 1944, in contrast to the closeness of 
cooperation in other areas.  
 
 
 
 
In April, 1944, the United States Under-Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, 
conducted a three-week mission to London. The aim was to explore and clarify a 
range of political issues with America’s British allies. It was an opportunity to 
confront divergences in policy since the Teheran conference ended in December 
1943. A central political issue for the two allies was their handling of relations with 
the USSR. It is therefore striking that the mission made little attempt to consider 
Anglo-American policies on this issue. Instead, Stettinius observed in his report, 
with marked detachment, that ‘the British seemed curiously unaware of the fact 
that American relations with Russia are at present enjoying less friction than their 
own.’1 This intriguing remark has been given little attention in the extensive 
literature on wartime Anglo-American relations. It highlights, however, an aspect 
of that relationship that can be overlooked as a result of viewing wartime British-
American-Soviet interactions through a bilateral East-West prism – a tendency 
which has continued after the end of the Cold War and has distorted understanding 
of the relationships between the three major powers during the alliance period.
2
  
 The Stettinius mission and developments before and immediately following 
it show the limits of Anglo-American cooperation on one of the most vital issues 
that faced the two countries. It was a period when alliance politics were in a state of 
change and uncertainty. Scholars have drawn attention in recent years to the 
elements of contention as well as cooperation in the Anglo-American alliance, and 
have explored the management of these divergences.
3
 It has long been held that the 
British by 1944 had come to be more suspicious of future Soviet intentions, and 
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had adopted a harder line in policy towards them.
4
 This is usually contrasted with 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s continuing efforts to promote goodwill. This 
article will argue that there were indeed considerable differences between the two 
states on this fundamental issue, but they are not in fact reducible to such a 
straightforward dichotomy. Examination of interactions in the six months 
following the end of the Teheran Conference in December 1943 shows the allies 
not only aware of these differences but also knowingly eschewing the opportunity 
to construct a consensus. The little-known Stettinius mission thus serves as a good 
indicator of the nature of the Anglo-American political alliance.  
 By October 1943, the tide of war had changed in the Allies’ favour. The Red 
Army was advancing rapidly through the Ukraine and had recently liberated Kiev. 
Anglo-American forces had landed in Italy, and American forces were beginning 
their advance through the Central Pacific. After a tense period of relations owing to 
the failure to launch a second front in Northern France, the United States-Great 
Britain-Soviet Union alliance moved into a new phase with a successful foreign 
ministers conference in Moscow in October, followed by the Big Three meeting at 
Teheran at the end of November. Roosevelt appointed one of his trusted envoys, 
W. Averell Harriman, to be ambassador at Moscow.
5
 The beginning of closer 
political cooperation in these summit meetings brought to the fore the question of 
whether the British and Americans were going to conduct their political 
relationship with the Soviets in the same combined manner as they were 
conducting their military affairs. At heart, as they considered the strategy for finally 
defeating Germany and Japan, and as they began to formulate their ideas about the 
post-war world, the issue they particularly needed to agree on, and from which 
positions on specific issues flowed, was whether the USSR, the former 
international outcast and source of revolutionary subversion, could or would be a 
cooperative partner and, if so, what was the best strategy to bring it about?  
 The key to answering this question lay in trying to understand the nature of 
the Soviet state and the aims and motivations of its leaders. The war brought 
increased contacts and sources of information, with far more Americans and 
Britons stationed in the USSR than ever before. The process of analysis was 
complicated by the crucial fact that the war was observably a transformative 
experience in the USSR, so that analysts were drawn to devote attention to the 
process of change. On the other hand, those witnessing these developments on the 
ground did so while themselves living under the restrictions imposed on foreign 
nationals in the USSR. This could have a profound impact on how these 
individuals perceived the Soviet Union, its leaders and its foreign policy.
6
  
 Having experienced the way the Soviet security forces responded to the 
alliance – by regarding foreign diplomats, journalists and soldiers as spies –  those 
serving in Moscow were naturally struck by the cooperative manner displayed by 
Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov at the October foreign 
ministers meeting and by Josef Stalin at the Big Three meeting.
7
 After the Teheran 
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conference ended in December, analysts in London and Washington were eager to 
ascertain whether the new Soviet style would last, and whether it signified a 
commitment to a more cooperative policy. Representatives in Moscow were 
encouraged to state their views on this. The question was seen to be intimately 
linked with other changes taking place in the USSR, notably the official approval 
of the Russian Orthodox Church, the emphasis on patriotic, rather than ideological, 
themes in state propaganda, constitutional changes ostensibly giving more 
autonomy to the republics, and social and cultural reforms that were moving Soviet 
society back towards more traditional practices.
8
  
 
American views 
Averell Harriman addressed and connected these various phenomena in the months 
immediately following the Teheran conference. He particularly focused on two 
issues that were being much discussed in the Moscow diplomatic community, and 
went on to draw out from them a recommendation as to how the Americans and 
British should act in order to influence the Soviets to continue to move in the 
direction of cooperation. The two issues were the post-war reconstruction needs of 
the USSR and the internal politics of the Soviet wartime leadership.  
 Soon after arriving in Moscow, Harriman asserted that the Soviet 
Government regarded reconstruction as its most important political, as well as 
economic, problem. It would therefore play an important role in allied relations 
with the USSR.
9
 The potential impact of Soviet post-war economic problems and 
reconstruction needs was to be a subject of speculation during 1944, and was a 
central element of estimates of Soviet intentions regarding cooperation with the 
allies. In both the American and British governments there was a broad consensus 
concerning the centrality of post-war reconstruction in Soviet policy-making. The 
colossal destructiveness of the war on the Eastern Front would, it was believed, 
leave the economic infrastructure in the most productive areas of the USSR in 
ruins.
10
 The British Ministry of Economic Warfare and the American Board of 
Economic Warfare pooled much of their information on the Soviet economic 
situation, but they never reached agreement on how long reconstruction would 
take.
11
 Estimates varied between five and twenty years, but all were agreed that 
making good the damage of the war would be a major aim of Stalin's policy.
12 
British and Americans saw this to be an important factor in his foreign policy, but 
they parted company on exactly what use to make of this.  
 The chief American interest in the reconstruction question revolved around 
the provision of assistance in the form of credits and trading arrangements. Soviet 
needs in this area were seen as providing an opportunity to influence their policy 
towards cooperation along the lines the United States desired. There was a range of 
views as to how this might be exploited, often depending on how much it was felt 
the Soviet economy would be actually dependant on outside aid. Two main schools 
of thought are evident with regard to the implications of Soviet reconstruction 
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needs. Harriman saw reconstruction loans and credits could be used as bargaining 
counters in negotiations, achieving specific concessions in return, while Roosevelt, 
Harry Hopkins and Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau saw the provision of 
credit as a means to improve the overall environment in which relations would be 
conducted.
13
 Even if it was just one of a number of options open to the Soviet 
leadership, it was still felt that the hopes for US economic assistance and access to 
American technology and resources might be a powerful incentive for 
cooperation.
14
 Interestingly, Ivan Maisky when considering the issue of postwar 
cooperation in his position as a deputy commissar for foreign affairs, considered 
the reconstruction problem to be a good reason for keeping good relations with the 
British and Americans, while also expressing the orthodox Soviet opinion that the 
capitalists would themselves need to trade with the USSR after the war.
15
 
 Following up on Harriman’s conjecture, Elbridge Durbrow, in charge of East 
European affairs in the State Department, argued that Soviet fear of their own 
weakness was the best lever to induce them to drop what was characterised in the 
Department as their ‘unilateralist’ policy. Durbrow thought the Soviet leaders 
probably realised that cooperation with the US was the one policy that could assure 
wholehearted western aid to repair the devastation of their country, and he 
concluded from this that the US should follow a policy combining friendliness and 
firmness – essentially a mixture of sticks and carrots to persuade the Soviets it was 
in their interest to ‘join the family of nations as a fully-fledged member.’ Through 
this method, it might be possible to convince them to drop what Durbrow described 
as ‘the odious aspects of their “backdoor” methods of interference in other 
countries.’  
 Although it clearly squared with a major Soviet material interest, however, 
Durbrow felt that this goal would still be difficult to attain.
 
State Department Soviet 
experts remained sceptical about developments in the USSR, especially in regard to 
religion and the abolition of the Comintern, although as Eduard Mark pointed out, 
there had been since before the war a readiness among some officials in the 
Department and elsewhere in Washington to see Stalin’s Soviet Union as impelled 
by nationalistic rather than revolutionary motivations.
16
 It is important to note, 
however, that the use of the term ‘firm’ did not imply non-cooperation, and should 
not be taken to presage proto-Cold War attitudes. There is certainly an element of 
‘tough bargaining’ here, but also a sense that the Soviet reconstruction problem, if 
managed effectively, could be used to lever the USSR into being cooperative with 
the allies and conforming to American models of  inter-state behaviour.
17
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 Harriman and some in the State Department and other parts of the 
Washington bureaucracy believed the changes in the USSR had potential 
significance, and in particular linked them with the idea that there were different 
schools of opinion within the Soviet leadership regarding the internal application of 
ideology and relations with the allies. This view derived from the observation that 
at times Stalin was much more cooperative in his demeanour than other leading 
figures and rank-and file officials. Harriman had observed this in October 1941 at 
the Moscow supply conference and it was to be one of his consistent themes. There 
was speculation that there were a number of power centres within the Soviet ruling 
elite, and moreover that those in the Politburo and the Red Army had sufficient 
independence to put forward their own views and to be able to argue with Stalin. 
Two schools of thought were postulated. One was cooperative, believing that 
Soviet interests were best served by association with the West to control German 
power. The other had favoured the German option before the war.
18
 Its members 
were said to be die-hard members of the Communist Party and the officials of the 
NKVD, and possibly also the marshals of the army in the field. They were held 
deeply to distrust foreigners, and to believe the USSR should follow a kind of  
‘Fortress Russia’ policy, dependent on its own resources, behind a defensive glacis 
of subservient bordering states. The key question was where Stalin stood in this 
policy debate. While some saw him as sharing many of the attitudes of the 
isolationist group, the common assumption was that he was in the cooperative 
school, and shared this outlook with many of the managerial types seen as having 
come to the fore as a result of the policy of ‘socialism in one country.’19 It was 
concluded, moreover, that Stalin was essentially a realist, who, though suspicious 
and sensitive, understood the realities of power. Security was his main concern. He 
needed to be educated, however, to understand that the security and economic 
benefits that would result from cooperation with the United States were conditional 
on the USSR dropping its tendency to defy the norms of international behaviour 
and ceasing to operate unilaterally.
20
  
 
British views of Soviet policy 
When British viewpoints are examined for the same period, from Teheran to the 
Stettinius mission, at first sight is difficult to understand why Stettinius emphasised 
their difference from those of the United States. The leading officials in the Foreign 
Office (FO), Permanent Under-Secretary Sir Alexander Cadogan and Deputy 
Under-Secretary Sir Orme Sargent recognised that if cooperative relations were not 
maintained with the USSR after the war, the situation would be grim. Cadogan was 
reluctant to expect much from the Soviets: Sargent, who occupied a pivotal role 
conveying the views of the regional departments to the Foreign Secretary, showed 
more readiness to believe that skilful diplomacy could achieve that result.
21
 FO 
officials tended to see the way to engender long-term cooperation to involve 
‘firmness’, ‘frankness’ and ‘fairness’, the same words used by Harriman and the 
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DEA. There was much common ground in the way that the two bureaucracies had 
come to view their Soviet ally. The State Department and FO and the two 
embassies made some similar basic assumptions. They both used ethnic stereotypes 
to characterize the Soviets, regarding them as essentially ‘oriental’, which was 
taken to mean that they would regard concessions and excessive praise as signs of 
weakness, and would be encouraged to press for more. They respected a bargain, 
particularly a hard one. These assumptions were the basis for the axiom of 
‘firmness with frankness’; the stating of interests clearly, dispensing with 
sentiment, but at the same time consulting the Soviets and in the process 
‘civilizing’ them so that as Durbrow put it, they would join the ‘family of 
nations’.22  By ‘firmness’, the professional diplomatists in Washington and London 
thus did not mean a Cold War-style confrontation, but held that since the Soviets 
were ‘orientals’ and potential bullies, they would respect those who stood up for 
their interests. However, as with other aspects of the Anglo-American partnership, 
similar words masked differences in meaning: cultural differences, geo-political 
concerns and, to a degree, ideology, produced divergent concepts and policies.
 
 The British placed Soviet reconstruction needs at the centre of their analyses 
of the prospects of cooperation with the Soviets as did the Americans, but they 
approached the issue rather differently. In 1943, they had hopes of being able to 
provide such aid, which would be an economic benefit to Britain as well as help 
build up a positive post-war relationship with the Soviets. Investigations with 
companies which had traded with the USSR before the war established that they 
were honest in business and adhered to contractual arrangements.
23
 By 1944 it was 
becoming doubtful that Britain would have much in the way of resources to offer to 
the Soviets in the crucial immediate post-war period. However, trade for British 
businesses was only a minor element of FO interest in the issue. Far more 
important was the conclusion that the FO Northern Department and the embassy in 
Moscow drew from their assumption of the immensity of Soviet reconstruction 
requirements. Where Durbrow saw a need to actively use the issue for leverage, the 
British concluded that the issue would drive Soviet behaviour without specific 
encouragement from the allies. In the Northern Department, the assumption of 
Soviet reconstruction needs underpinned the conclusion that the Soviets would 
cooperate with the allies. They would do this not out of sentiment, nor because they 
had changed their ideology, but from over-riding and urgent material interest. The 
FO drew a firmer conclusion on this than the Americans because they saw the 
motivation working differently. It was not so much that the Soviets hoped for 
credits, but because reconstruction, which the FO believed was likely to be based 
as much as possible on the established Soviet policy of self-sufficiency, would 
mean they needed a long period of peace and stability. This could best, and most 
cheaply, be achieved by cooperation with the allies, so long as they were convinced 
the allies were sincere in cooperating with them and would help them to hold down 
Germany. This strong assumption about the reconstruction needs of the USSR, 
independent of specific allied actions, produced a series of formulations about 
Soviet cooperation in 1943-44 that can be seen as optimistic, but which officials 
regarded as realistic. It followed that the main way the allies could ensure 
cooperation would not be credits or trade, but mutual recognition of security 
interests. It was this conclusion regarding the reconstruction question that was the 
basis for what is often described as ‘pragmatism’ on the part of the FO.24 
 To be sure, the FO’s Soviet specialists were markedly more optimistic than 
those in the American government. The Northern Department contained some 
officials convinced of Stalin’s interest in long-term cooperation and the limited 
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nature of his ambitions. The main contributor of detailed analysis was Geoffrey 
Wilson, a temporary official of Quaker background, who had been personal 
secretary to the left-wing MP Sir Stafford Cripps on a visit to the USSR in 1940. 
The Head of the Department, Christopher Warner, a professional diplomat, but no 
expert on the Soviet Union, was a little more cautious, but susceptible to Wilson’s 
line of argument. Generally, the Northern Department and Ambassador Sir 
Archibald Clark Kerr’s embassy in Moscow had come to believe that a post-war 
alliance with the Soviet Union, at least while Stalin was alive, was possible and 
desirable. The USSR, they believed, had been transformed by Stalin and his policy 
of ‘socialism in one country’ into a nation-state rather than a ‘revolutionary 
notion.’ Changes in Soviet society of a conservative nature since Stalin’s rise to 
power had been accelerated by war. They were very aware that this state had 
expansionist tendencies, akin to those that had brought Russia into conflict with 
Britain for 125 years, but projecting forward from these internal developments, 
they appeared to be of a traditional kind that the FO felt competent to understand 
and deal with. Soviet interests, the guiding principle for the realist Stalin, appeared 
to point in the direction of the kind of cooperation the British also desired: limited 
in many ways (not involving exchange of cryptographical or atomic secrets, for 
example), but real nonetheless. They were more optimistic in regard to religion and 
the abolition of the Comintern than their counterparts in the State Department.
25
 
The embassy, however, was inclined to be sceptical about the two schools thesis, 
while prepared to accept that Stalin was more friendly than Molotov. Within the 
embassy, the ambassador’s second-in-command, Sir John Balfour, was closer to 
the Americans than Clark Kerr was: the ambassador disliked the Moscow 
diplomatic corps, which he nicknamed the ‘anti-Soviet sewing bee.’ He tried to 
avoid the closed, gossipy and often bitter world of the diplomats, and make human 
contact with his Soviet counterparts – interestingly, the only one with whom he 
succeeded seems to have been Stalin himself. While, therefore, Balfour was on 
close terms with George Kennan, his opposite number at the US embassy, Clark 
Kerr worked well enough with Harriman, but they did not spend a lot of time 
sharing their insights into the USSR.
26
 
 By 1944, the FO believed the Soviets would be dominant in Eastern Europe, 
and that a British-coordinated Western Europe would be linked to this by the 
Anglo-Soviet Alliance. By this means would Germany be restrained, even if the 
Americans withdrew from Europe. They believed this aim was capable of 
achievement, though diplomacy with the suspicious Soviets was difficult. It would  
require the skilled blend of firmness with friendly frankness that the FO believed 
they themselves possessed.
27
 The FO certainly shared the American preference for 
a policy of ‘firmness’. However, for them it was part of a different spectrum of 
possible policies: it represented a middle course between a ‘soft’ policy of 
concessions, even appeasement, and a ‘hard’ policy of refusal of any collaborative 
action except on terms of strict and symmetrical reciprocity, with the default 
position of no contact at all. The key to understanding the FO’s approach was that 
firmness was always to be associated with frankness, which centred on an open 
exchange of views, stating one’s interests without fear that doing so would stymie 
cooperation. The difficulty was finding an appropriately calibrated policy that did 
not feed Soviet suspicions.  
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Churchill and Eden 
Prime Minister Churchill was not in sympathy with all elements of the FO analysis. 
He was not yet, however, the Cold Warrior of later years. From the start of the war, 
he had tended to see Soviet policy as driven by interests not ideology.
28
 In January 
1944, Churchill noted that he was impressed by Stalin and the ‘deep-seated 
changes’ in the USSR.29 However, he had attempted a style of handling Stalin, by 
focusing on military issues and eschewing political ones, which developments early 
in 1944 revealed to be inadequate. Although the War Cabinet endorsed the future 
potential for cooperation with the USSR in January 1944, the cooperative glow of 
Teheran faded quickly for both Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden.
30
 
Their response was inclined to be emotional. This became evident when Pravda 
published a story in January 1944 that the British had been attempting to negotiate 
a separate peace with Germans in Romania. The story cut Churchill to the quick.
31
 
It was followed in the next two months by a failure to make any progress in 
bringing together the London Polish Government-in-exile and the Soviets. The 
Poles would not accept the loss of eastern territory to the USSR, which had been 
agreed in their absence at Teheran, and the Soviets refused to restore relations with 
the Poles, which they had severed in April 1943 over the issue of the Katyn 
massacre. While they had pressed the Poles to agree on the frontier, Churchill and 
Eden began to see sinister motivations in the Soviet demands for changes in the 
personnel of the Polish Government as a precondition for opening territorial 
discussions.
32
  
 Eden expressed doubts about the Soviets as counterpoints to the optimistic 
assertions from the Northern Department, though his tendency when faced with 
Churchillian ire was to attempt to mitigate its force. At one point in February 1944 
he noted the persistence of suspicions of the Soviet Union in certain sections of the 
Conservative party (his own party) with the implication that he did not share them 
and indeed that they were somewhat antediluvian.
33
 Thus, just prior to Stettinius’s 
visit, he is to be found asserting to Churchill that actually the Soviets had not done 
much wrong recently – implying that odd incidents, and the tone of comments in 
the Soviet press, should not be taken too seriously – and also implying that the 
Polish issue should be treated as sui generis.  
 The occasion for this statement by Eden was a comment by US Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull to Lord Halifax, the British ambassador at Washington, on 28 
March. Hull was one of those who believed the Soviets’ default position was 
unilateralism, and was sensitive to signs that the turn to cooperation was 
superficial. He had been absent from Teheran, where Roosevelt embarked on his 
project to form a bilateral relationship with Stalin, and at the end of March 1944 he 
pressed for the formulation of a joint Anglo-American approach, assuming that the 
British shared his apprehensions. Hull was responding to the strongly expressed 
misgivings within his department, from Durbrow and others, but also to American 
press speculation that the USSR was failing to follow a multilateral, consultative 
policy in its relations with Poland.
34
 
                                                 
28 Martin Gilbert, Road to Victory (London, 1986),  323, 471, 492, 501. When he gave his famous 
‘riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’ comment about Soviet policy, he went on to describe 
the key to it as Soviet national interest, BBC radio broadcast 1 October 1939. 
29 Churchill to Eden 16 Jan. 1944 PREM3/399/6. 
30 WM(44)11th mtg Confidential Annexe (CA) 25 Jan. 1944 CAB65/45. 
31 Churchill to Stalin 24 Jan., Eden minute 28 Jan. 1944 PREM3/396/11; cf Hull to Harriman 15 Jan. 
1944 FRUS1944:III, 1229. Warner thought that the Pravda story had been a retort to a Daily Express 
report that a British mission to Romania had been carrying a proposed Soviet-German treaty. He 
warned against assuming the Soviets had changed policy simply because of a few adverse press 
articles, Warner minute 25 Jan. 1944 FO371/43304/N776. 
32 Churchill to Stalin 28 Jan. 1944 FO371/39387/C1067. 
33 Eden minute 18 Feb. 1944  FO371/43304/N937; Eden to Churchill 13 March 1944 PREM4/18/3. 
34 Durbrow memo 3 Feb.,  Harriman to Hull 13 March 1944 FRUS1944:IV, 816, 1054, 951; Hull 
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 Hull suggested to Halifax that the time had come for a plain-speaking Anglo-
American approach to Stalin, pointing out to him the consequences if he continued 
taking one-sided action. Halifax noted  
He was clearly perturbed at the criticism of the 
United States Government over the whole field of 
foreign policy arising from the general feeling that 
the tide of Moscow and Tehran had ebbed.  
He attributed this in the main to the one-sided 
behaviour of Russia…  
Only thing approaching a remedy that he could 
suggest for this was somehow or other to establish 
closer relations between the Prime Minister, the 
President and Stalin.
35
 
 
 Hull’s emphasis on working together appealed to Churchill, and he suggested 
to Eden that an Anglo-American approach be made, while simultaneously lapsing 
into ‘a moody silence’ in diplomatic contacts more generally. He proposed to 
follow that principle in his own correspondence.
36
  
 Like Hull, the British leaders were concerned about Soviet ‘unilateral’ 
actions, though the policies that gave offence to them were not always the same 
ones that aroused Hull’s misgivings. The Soviets had acted unilaterally in Italy in 
recognising Marshal Badoglio as the head of the Italian government, ahead of the 
British and Americans, and the Italian communists were being cooperative as 
members of an expanded government. This excited Eden’s suspicions in particular: 
even though the regime in Italy could not have existed without Anglo-American 
sanction, it was the mode of Soviet action that rang alarm bells. It seemed of a 
piece with the Soviet press giving exaggerated accounts of the prowess of the 
Greek communist resistance, EAM/ELAS. Eden was showing some signs of 
exhaustion at the time – indeed when it was proposed that Stettinius come over 
during the Easter parliamentary recess he responded petulantly, declaring himself 
tired and in need of a break.
37
 He expressed deep pessimism about Soviet aims – 
the dominance of Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean and the ‘communizing of 
much that remains’ – in internal FO papers.38  
 However, when Churchill voiced his own misgivings, Eden attempted to 
argue him out of the idea of a showdown, adopting as his own the less pessimistic 
views of his officials, and commenting ‘In point of fact, exasperating as recent 
Russian behaviour has been, I feel we ought not to jump to the conclusion that they 
have decided to go back on the policy of co-operation. There have been not a few 
cases on the credit side.’ Eden asserted that the Soviets were not only not being 
uncooperative, but that Britain had boosted EAM and the Yugoslav partisans 
before the Soviets had. Churchill did not press the showdown idea.
39
 Conversely, 
when the Soviets asked for an air base in south Italy, Eden saw this as sinister, and 
Churchill regarded it very calmly. It would be wrong, therefore to pick out 
Churchill’s eminently quotable minutes and see them as indications of consistent 
policy rather than spontaneous expressions of frustration that were set aside on 
                                                 
35 Halifax to FO 28 March 1944 FO371/43304/N1908.  
36 Churchill to Eden 1 April 1944 FO371/43304/N2128. Churchill had just received a curt message 
from Stalin on the Polish issue, Vladimir Pechatnov, ‘How Stalin and Molotov Wrote Messages to 
Churchill. Following Stalin’s Archives’ Russia in Global Affairs 7 (2009),  170. 
37 Eden scribbled note on Halifax to Eden 10 March, Eden to Halifax 20 March 1944: ‘Everybody here 
is very tired, especially your humble servant, and we must get a few days at Easter if we are to 
remain alive’ FO371/38578/AN1196. 
38 Eden notes on Wilson and Sargent minutes 3 April 1944 FO371/43304/N1908. 
39 Eden to Churchill 5 April 1944. Sargent noted on 19 April, ‘Sufficient time has now elapsed to allow 
tempers to calm. ... I am sure it would be best in these circumstances to let sleeping dogs lie.’ 
Warner thought Hull would not pursue the matter if no further cases of Soviet lack of cooperation 
attracted the attention of the newspapers, minute 7 April 1944 FO371/43304/N2128. 
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reflection.
40
 As these exchanges took place, FO officials expressed regret at the 
emotional outbursts and swings between euphoria and hostility. The theme of 
Warner and others was that calm, unexcited consistency, plus patience and 
firmness, were needed. Appeasement, Warner had written in January, had had its 
time – but at the same time he and his officials put forward detailed papers on the 
favourable prospects of cooperation with the Soviets and pressed that what was 
crucial was proper handling of them.
41
 Sargent had responded to Hull’s remarks by 
arguing that cooperation had not broken down: the objectionable aspects of Soviet 
behaviour were because of  ignorance and clumsiness and the fact that their 
officials had been indoctrinated for twenty years not to cooperate. The implication 
was that the British were better attuned to understanding Soviet policy than the 
Americans. While the Americans might feel it was an option, Sargent argued that 
for Britain it would be disastrous to abandon cooperation with the USSR unless 
forced to. Britain should protest about unacceptable behaviour, but a joint Anglo-
American front should be avoided as it would provoke adverse Soviet reactions.
42
 
 This was the atmosphere that Stettinius’s mission picked up while in London. 
The main items on Stettinius’s agenda were post-war international organization and 
the future of British colonialism. More specific matters included limits on Spanish 
wolfram exports to Germany. Stettinius had lunch with Churchill, at which he was 
impressed by the extraordinary amount of port and brandy the prime minister 
consumed, had talks with John Anderson, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and 
stayed in the country with Eden.
43
 This was Eden’s way of getting his rest and not 
delivering too strong a snub to the American. He also met the King of Greece, and 
the Prime Minister of Poland, and much of his time was spent visiting American 
army units preparing for D-Day, such as the 101st Airborne – a schedule cooked up 
by the FO to get him out of Eden’s hair. The main topic the British wanted to talk 
about was the non-functioning of the European Advisory Commission (EAC), 
wherein the American representative had been less forthcoming than the Soviet 
one.  
 The British anticipated that Stettinius would bring up Soviet 
uncooperativeness and follow up Hull’s comments to Halifax, but Hull had no 
desire to use Stettinius as an intermediary, and he did not address the matter 
directly.
44
 This vital topic seems only to have been touched upon directly with the 
British once, though Stettinius did discuss Soviet actions with some of the exile 
governments. The one occasion was a conversation between Warner and H. 
Freeman Matthews, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs, on 17 
April. It was merely a sharing of views rather than a discussion of tactics, let alone 
an attempt at co-ordinating them or even drawing joint tactical conclusions from 
the viewpoints they shared. Matthews noted in his account of the conversation that 
there was no great divergence of views on the USSR. Matthews explained the 
difficulties they had with American public opinion, and the disillusionment 
produced by the Polish situation and the Soviet recognition of Badoglio. He 
                                                 
40 Compare Churchill’s comments at War Cabinet 11 May WM(44)63rd mtg CA with those of 11 April 
WM(44)47th mtg CA CAB65/46. David Reynolds describes Churchill’s attitude to the USSR at this 
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41 Warner to Clark Kerr 25 Jan. 1944 FO800/302; FO paper ‘Probable Post-War Tendencies’ 19 April 
1944 FO371/43335/N1008.  
42 Sargent minute 3 April 1944 FO371/43304/N1908. 
43 Thomas R. Campbell and George C. Herring, The Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 1943-1946 
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stressed how Hull pressed on Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet ambassador in 
Washington, the need to work through consultation and mutual agreement rather 
than unilateral action. Warner and Matthews agreed that the message seemed to be 
getting through. Warner took Sargent’s line that there was a tendency to see every 
Soviet action as part of a carefully thought-out long term plan, and to attribute 
deep-lying motives to some minor act. This was inaccurate, Warner said, and 
overlooked internal political needs and purposes in the USSR. This reflected the 
frustration of his department with what they saw as over-excitable reactions by 
those who did not pay attention to the full picture. Warner believed cooperation 
with the USSR in the post-war era to be the most important objective of British 
policy. Given the background of Soviet hostility and suspicion – Matthews noted 
that Warner did not mention traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry – Warner believed 
the road ‘will be long, slow and painful, but that the chances of ultimate success are 
pretty good.’ Matthews added that Warner seemed to fear that the Americans 
would be less patient with the Soviets and that relations might deteriorate as a 
consequence: 
He seemed quite relieved when I assured him that the 
Secretary is well aware of all the pitfalls and the 
slowness with which Russian cooperation and 
consultation must necessarily develop and that his 
policy is equally one of the utmost patience.
45
 
 Although Matthews seemed satisfied that there was little divergence in view, 
in fact, Warner’s comments accurately reflected some key viewpoints that were 
leading the British away from the Americans and would make coordination of 
policy out of the question. They felt that the behaviour that prompted Hull’s fears 
of unilateralism was mainly caused by Soviet ignorance and clumsiness. There was 
also a concern that surfaces in a number of comments in the FO, and in the next 
two months from Churchill and Eden too, that the Americans were less engaged 
with European problems and more likely to plunge ahead recklessly with policies 
that would make the situation worse. It is interesting that usually the British are 
presented as the tougher in 1944, with the Americans (notably the president) 
following a policy that was far too concessionary, whereas at the time, the British 
feared the Americans would  push relations to a break through impatience.
46
  
 The Americans, for their part, thought the British were making things 
difficult for themselves. Stettinius concluded, on the basis of Matthews’ talk and 
passing remarks by Eden and Churchill, that while the British saw continuing 
cooperation with the USSR to be the keystone of their post-war policy in Europe, 
there was friction in Anglo-Soviet relations that was not present in Soviet-
American relations.
47
 
 
Divergences become evident 
The opportunity the Stettinius mission offered to coordinate tactics of handling the 
Soviets soon passed. The exhausted Eden had gone on leave after Stettinius’s visit. 
Churchill took on the role of Foreign Secretary, and allowed himself to be drawn 
into a fruitless dispute with Molotov. In December 1943, the British had 
parachuted some officers into Romania to make contact with opposition elements: 
                                                 
45 Matthews memorandum of conversation 17 April 1944 RG59 761.00/4-1744. Warner also 
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they had been captured, but their leader, Colonel Alfred de Chastellain, had been 
used by Romanian dictator Ion Antonescu to encipher a message which the Soviets 
regarded as offensive.
48
 In April, the Soviets, whose troops were soon to enter 
Romania, cast aspersions on British motivations, implying once again that they 
were dealing with the enemy. The FO suspected that similar suspicions regarding 
this mission (Operation Autonomous) had been the cause of the Pravda secret 
peace story in January. Churchill protested British innocence and accused Molotov 
of having ‘got hold of a mare’s nest.’ Molotov’s reply seemed to Churchill to be an 
attack on his good faith. He  replied robustly. While the FO enjoyed  Churchill’s 
tough language, they viewed the whole correspondence as regrettable. It called 
forth, not for the first time, a comment by Eden when he returned from leave that 
he wished the prime minister would desist from such messages to the Soviets.
 49
  
Observing this exchange reinforced a sense of superiority in the State Department. 
On 6 May the DEA noted that it was ‘evidence of general mistrust, bad manners 
and acerbity between two of the major Allies.’ Cavendish Cannon of the Southern 
Europe desk at the DEA remarked that Churchill’s language ‘impressed me as 
being dangerously rough and ill-tempered for a minor incident when more 
important issues require good will on both sides.’50 Cannon’s tone of critical 
detachment is typical of the way both the Americans and British regarded each 
other’s apparently faltering relations with the USSR.  
 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Americans drew the conclusion that 
British relations with the Soviets were considerably worse than their own. Where 
the British suspected the Americans of being short of patience, the Americans felt 
the British approach more likely to bring confrontation than cooperation. 
Consequently there was no desire to coordinate policies and thereby tie the 
Americans into British troubles. No attempt was made on the basis of Stettinius’s 
report to narrow the perceived gap – and soon the changing military situation in the 
Balkans region made it harder to do so, as the British attempted to apply their 
‘frankness’ approach to handling the issues raised by Soviet advances in Romania 
and the Americans stuck to their inclination to avoid direct involvement in what 
they regarded as subsidiary political issues.
51
 
 In Whitehall, despite Churchill’s angry invective, the FO were moving 
ahead, seeking to build on the keystone concept and operationalise cooperation 
through working arrangements involving accepting each other’s policies in 
particular areas, in preference to the creation of more consultative machinery. Their 
experience with the EAC, which they had proposed with high hopes in October 
1943, but which had made very slow progress, influenced their preference for more 
ad hoc bilateral arrangements. The implication of the keystone concept was that 
there would be de facto west and east European blocs, which would be prevented 
from being confrontational or exclusive spheres of influence by the over-arching 
Anglo-Soviet Treaty, the binding element. They now sought to use a pragmatic 
arrangement concerning Romania as the foundation for a more general principle.
52
  
 While there had been fractious exchanges over the de Chastellain mission, 
otherwise, Anglo-Soviet relations over Romania seemed to the FO to be working 
quite well. They made clear to the Soviets that Britain would follow their lead, and 
in return the Soviet terms for Romanian surrender seemed moderate and even 
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generous. Furthermore, before the de Chastellain issue had blown up with 
Churchill, Molotov had made a point of stating his own ignorance on the Greek 
issue and explicitly invited the British to take the lead and provide guidance.
53
 At a 
time when Churchill was recommending Clark Kerr be brought home for a time, 
and pressing for consideration of a showdown over communist intrigues in Italy, 
Yugoslavia and Greece, Eden and the FO Southern Department embarked on a 
different approach to getting better Soviet behaviour.
54
 This initiative has often 
been discussed, though almost always simply as a prelude to the Churchill-Stalin 
‘percentages’ discussion in October 1944.55 It should also be viewed as an attempt 
to put into practice the preferred FO way of handling the Soviets, through frank 
discussion of interests: a method which Churchill now found to have some 
attractions. He preferred to coordinate with the Americans, but if that was not 
possible, he showed as the issue unfolded that he was prepared to proceed anyway. 
In a conversation with Soviet ambassador Fyodor Gusev on 5 May, Eden suggested 
casually that an arrangement like that over Romania might also be profitably 
followed over Greece. Gusev received the suggestion favourably and on 18 May 
reported that his government accepted the idea that they take the lead in Romania 
and Britain take the lead in Greece. They asked, however, what American views 
were. It was the Soviets who thus showed most concern for the tripartite aspect of 
cooperation at this point.
56
 
 Having vented his feelings in internal minutes (and over dinner with his 
friend Harriman), Churchill then proved easy to convince of the possibility of 
managing Soviet tendencies by agreements based on the recognition of mutual 
interest.
57
 This kind of arrangement was in effect what ‘firmness and frankness’ 
meant to the British, though such bilateral and specific arrangements were a long 
way from what the Americans conceived of as the proper form for cooperation. 
Thus it was that while Churchill adopted with zeal the division of responsibility 
that Eden and Gusev had discussed, the issue came to demonstrate the gulf between 
British and American views of how to handle cooperation with the Soviet Union. 
Although it was ostensibly for ease of wartime collaboration, the prime British aim 
in May was clearly political, and with long-term goals.
58
 Halifax was told the idea 
of the Soviets ‘taking the lead’ in Romania and the British doing the same in 
Greece was a useful device for heading off divergence in the Balkans of which 
disquieting signs were emerging. Since they were already supporting Soviet policy 
in Romania, the FO meant divergence over Greece, and the urgency in the issue 
was supplied not principally by the advance of the Red Army, but by the recent 
mutiny of Greek forces in Egypt and the need to bring all Greek parties into line 
behind the Papandreou government.
59
 It was not a matter of spheres of influence, 
Halifax was told, nor was the intention to exclude the US.
60
 As with the later 
‘percentages’ discussions, it was principally a statement of British interests, to 
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provide a frank basis for realistic cooperation.
 61
 It would also hopefully avoid a 
repetition of the kind of tetchy exhange Churchill and Molotov in which had 
recently indulged. 
 The long-term aspect was immediately picked up in the State Department, 
where the response was firm opposition to anything that implied exclusive zones of 
political control.
62
 The Americans were also clearly affronted that the British had 
gone to the Soviets first, and this feeling was aggravated when the FO clumsily 
tried to claim that the Soviets were the ones who had brought the subject up. The 
North American department of the FO saw the American point of view and pressed 
that the habit must be acquired of consulting them before taking action. The 
problem then was that the Soviets would always be approached with an apparent 
piece of Anglo-American ‘ganging-up’.63 The preferred American solution was for 
all such discussion to take place in 3-power committees. Churchill found this 
stultifying and the FO, after the EAC experience, had come to prefer bilateral 
arrangements. Churchill wired to Halifax, ‘There is no spheres of influence [sic]. 
We shall all have to act together, but someone must be playing the hand… No fate 
could be worse for any country than to be subjected in these times to decisions 
reached by triangular or quadrangular telegraphing.’64  
 Roosevelt, echoing the State Department’s opinion, told Churchill that the 
proposal would result in the persistence of differences between Britain and the 
USSR, not their resolution. The Balkans would become divided into spheres of 
influence.
65
 The American response became confused when Roosevelt, with Hull 
out of town, changed his mind in the face of a direct appeal from Churchill.
66
 
Roosevelt assented to a three-month trial period, though the State Department’s 
continued opposition was so obvious that the Soviets picked it up and, although it 
fitted with their objectives, themselves backed away for a while from the 
arrangement because of their own concern to maintain the alliance.
67
 While 
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Churchill ascribed this outcome to what he called ‘the pedantic interference of the 
US,’ Eden blamed Churchill’s direct approach to Roosevelt for imperilling the 
FO’s hard work.68  While Soviet motives came under increased suspicion 
when a mission was secretly dispatched from an allied airfield in Italy to the EAM, 
the main British displeasure was directed towards the Americans.
69
  Churchill 
became so impassioned in defence of the arrangement that it is easy to get the 
impression that the idea was his from the beginning, rather than having arisen in 
the FO. At heart was the developed British view of how to cooperate with the 
Soviets and how that fitted with their overall vision for a post-war Europe from 
which the United States could be expected to have retreated.
70
  
 In the FO, schemes for a post-war Western bloc were now being mooted, and 
it was hoped that Stalin could be convinced that this was not threatening to the 
USSR (though the scheme was attractive partly because by containing Germany it 
also contained the Soviet Union). Indeed they believed from comments he made to 
Eden back in December 1941 that he supported the idea. As Stettinius had reported, 
the British conceived the Anglo-Soviet Treaty to be the cornerstone of their 
European policy - the centre of an arch linking the Western and Eastern European 
systems.
71
 All except Churchill that is, who saw a Western bloc as so weak as to be 
a burden and preferred a close Anglo-American relationship and simultaneous 
interest-based arrangements with the USSR to reduce areas of conflict and preserve 
vital British interests in Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean. The FO and 
Churchill, from different perspectives, were looking to limit and define the area of 
Soviet influence, and to begin to get Soviet acknowledgement of their own, though 
in neither case considering that these were exclusive zones. There was also a sense 
that the Soviets’ behaviour could be managed if they were committed to concrete 
arrangements – Stalin, it was sometimes asserted at this time, was a man of his 
word, once given, and the Soviets seemed to attach significance to proper written 
agreements. Being treated as equals by the great Western powers would also play 
to their pride and their inferiority complex and make them likely to limit their own 
actions because of the prestige and status they were gaining in world affairs in 
addition to the likely benefits of aid for reconstruction.
72
 
 While the Americans at times made similar assumptions, the British failed to 
persuade them to endorse this policy approach. The Americans remained 
determined that the British should not shape the Soviet policy of the Anglo-
American alliance nor act in any way as the intermediary between the USSR and 
the USA.
73
 They feared that an acceptance of a Soviet sphere would arouse fears in 
Western Europe that would lead to a western bloc and a hostile division of 
Europe.
74
 While many in the State Department and White House might well, as 
Eduard Mark argued, have accepted tacit spheres of interest, provided they were 
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sufficiently ‘open’, the potential ramifications both in western Europe and with 
American public opinion led them to find the British approach unacceptable.
75
 The 
Rumania/Greece proposal seemed to stem from the Anglo-Soviet friction that 
Stettinius had reported, confirmed by the Churchill-Molotov episode, although the 
British themselves saw it as a means to avoid such friction. To the Americans, 
there was another way of getting Soviet cooperation: they continued to assert to the 
British that cooperation in a general security system was the best way of ensuring 
against the Soviet adoption of the unilateralist option – an eventuality that schemes 
like the Romania/Greece arrangement appeared to encourage.
76
 They had a point: 
Churchill’s new attitude towards making pragmatic deals and Eden’s attachment to 
the Anglo-Soviet Treaty produced an inclination to bilateralism that in effect 
conceded some of the gains the Soviets would expect to get from a unilateralist 
approach, in order to prevent them actually activating such an approach, and 
thereby preserve cooperation in its broader sense. The Americans, more confident 
of their power and with a different vision of the future international order, were less 
prepared to do so and looked to contain the Soviets within a structure of 
consultation rather than manage divergence by division of prime responsibility.  
 
Conclusions 
Both British and Americans considered that their approach was having the greater 
success. Hull reiterated to Harriman in September 1944 what Stettinius and the 
State Department had perceived earlier in the year, namely that the British seemed 
unaware that Soviet relations with the United States were much better than Soviet 
relations with themselves.
77
 For their part, the British continued to believe that the 
Soviets distrusted the Americans more than them, were still worried about US 
isolationist tendencies, and looked to the Anglo-Soviet alliance to provide them 
with the assurance of security against Germany that was assumed to be their 
overriding policy aim.
78
 While Soviet documentation presently available does not 
fully corroborate that assumption, Ivan Maisky, who knew the British well after ten 
years in the London embassy, commented, ‘The British, knowing Europe better 
and having more political experience, have made substantially fewer mistakes than 
their allies in European affairs. The main thing is that they have known how to take 
account of facts, regardless of whether they like them or not…’79 
  Stettinius made a firm statement of the State Department’s desire to keep 
U.S. policy distinct from that of the British to Roosevelt on 8 November 1944,  
While the Government of the United States is fully 
aware of the existence of problems between Great 
Britain and the Soviet Union, this Government should 
not assume the attitude of supporting either country 
as against the other. Rather this Government should 
assert the independent interest of the United States 
(which is also believed to be in the general interest) in 
favor of equitable arrangements designed to attain 
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general peace and security on a basis of good 
neighborship...
80
 
 Both British and Americans continued therefore to question each other’s 
approach. Their policies remained parallel but separately constructed and at odds at 
significant points. Where they tried to influence each other they largely failed. 
Even Churchill, in Moscow in October 1944, was not above forging ahead with 
bilateral arrangements without consultation with the Americans.
81
 The American 
and British foreign policy bureaucracies continued consciously to pursue separate 
lines of policy. In this important instance, the Anglo-American partnership was 
well short of the coordinated integrated coalition that it had become in the military 
sector, in which policies were made jointly. The two bureaucracies, in their self-
satisfied comments that they were doing better than the other in their handling of 
the Soviets, were clearly happy with this. They found a justification for these 
separate policies, where it was needed, in the concept of a Soviet fear of Allied 
‘ganging-up,’ but from the documentary record, this does not suffice as the sole 
explanation for the separation between British and American policy approaches. It 
served to obscure differences of approach and objective, and in particular a belief 
on both sides of the Atlantic that the other’s approach was both wrong and failing. 
These shared convictions drove all parties to keep the issue separate when so many 
others were being subject to a joint approach. 
 It is evident that the difference between American and British policy 
formulations is not easily reducible to a formula that divides them on the issue of 
taking a ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ line towards the USSR. The common assertion that British 
policy had moved to a hard line during 1944 – partly in response to being kept at 
arm’s length by the Americans at the Teheran conference, though mainly in 
response to Soviet advances into Eastern Europe and the Balkans – does not fit the 
actual British policy debate. It is mainly based on certain well-known statements by 
Churchill. The views of others in his government need to be taken into account, 
and the context of his comments needs to be understood. Moreover, Churchill was 
by no means consistent. Most importantly, and this applied both sides of the 
Atlantic, and in the respective embassies and missions in Moscow, a policy 
recommendation of ‘firmness’, did not signify the adoption of Cold War attitudes. 
It was a tactic to achieve cooperation and Soviet behaviour modification, and was 
not based on the assumption that cooperation was impossible. Its application varied 
between agencies and key actors – a facet obscured by the shared vocabulary used.  
 The British and Americans had developed a range of views on how the 
alliance with the Soviets should be articulated, and, indeed, saw large implications 
for their own relationship in the format of that one. In particular, the issue of how 
best to handle the Soviets was influenced by a combination of views of each others 
aims and objectives taken concurrently with assessments of the aims of the Soviet 
leadership. There was interpenetration of ideas, but this did not prevent divergences 
on key policy issues, with little concerted attempt to resolve them. When it came to 
relations with the third great ally, the British and Americans, while both talked at 
times of the need for coordination,when the opportunity to coordinate policies 
arose, in April 1944, preferred to operate outside the context of the special 
relationship that characterised other aspects of their wartime partnership.  
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